




The Dutch 3-pillar pension scheme

Mercer Global Pension Index 2017





The Dutch 3-pillar pension scheme

- Good points (according to Mercer):
 - Generosity of Dutch pensions
 - Coverage



The second pillar (collective supplementary pensions)

- Points to improve (the Dutch debate):
 - Communication policies of pension funds
 - Little flexibility
 - Wage-earners and self-employed persons
 - Intergenerational risk sharing and redistribution




- Collective pension schemes share risks:
 - Equity return risk
 - Interest rate risk
 - Inflation risk
 - Longevity risk
 - Labour productivity risk




- Risk sharing is welfare-increasing
 - Expected utility:
 - Coefficient of risk aversion
 - Prospect theory:
 - Degree of loss aversion



Expected utility



Prospect theory





- Ex ante, risk sharing is welfare-increasing
 - For all participating generations
- Ex post, it may be perceived as welfare-reducing
 - Again for all generations



- Is risk sharing really welfare-increasing?
 - Equity premium
 - Inflation risk premium
 - Country risk premium



- How do pension funds implement risk sharing?
 - Pension contributions
 - Employers
 - Workers
 - Cuts in the indexation of pensions
 - Pension benefits (retired)
 - Pension accruals (workers)
 - Funding ratio



- Before 2000
 - Pension contribution rate
 - 1/3 employee
 - 2/3 employer
 - Lumpsum payments by employers



Collective pension funds in the Netherlands

	1998	2007	2016
DB, final wage	66.5	3.2	0.2
DB, average wage	25.0	87.8	90.3
DC	0.5	4.7	7.0



- After 2000
 - Indexation cuts
 - Cuts in nominal pensions
- According to expected utility theory
 - The two are equivalent
- According to prospect theory
 - The two may be very different




- Smaller role for pension contributions
 - Intergenerational risk sharing ↓
- Bigger role for indexation cuts
 - Intergenerational risk sharing -
- Bigger role for funding ratio
 - Intergenerational risk sharing ↑



Collective pension funds in the Netherlands







Funding ratio

- "Balance" between
 - Shocks in life expectancy and interest rate
 - Indexation cuts



Loss of purchasing power

- 2007-2017, the Netherlands:
 - 5-6 percent loss due to indexation cuts
 - 2 percent loss due to nominal cuts
 - Total: 7-8 percent loss
- 2011-2017, ABP, the largest pension fund in the NLs:
 - 13 percent loss



Loss of purchasing power

- Ex post, intergenerational risk sharing may be perceived as welfare-reducing
 - By all generations
- Series of cuts in indexation and nominal pensions have led to an intergenerational conflict
 - The old: back to guaranteed pensions
 - The young: get rid of any guarantees



Coalition agreement

- Abolish uniformity pricing
- Move towards a system of individual pensions with a collective buffer
- Investigate the option of lumpsum take-ups at retirement



Abolish uniformity pricing

- Less redistribution between young and old workers
- Less distortion of the decision to become a wage earner or self-employed
- But: transition problem
 - How to compensate all working generations for their excess contributions?



A system of individual pensions with a collective buffer

- Every participant has his or her own account
 - Greater transparency
- Via the buffer, intergenerational risk sharing will be preserved
- Details unknown yet:
 - Buffer cannot be negative
 - Size buffer is limited
 - Intergenerational risk sharing \u03c4



Lumpsum take-ups at retirement

- Investigate option to take up part of accrued pension wealth upon retirement
- The Netherlands are unique, together with Norway
- Greater amount of flexibility
- Take care of unwarranted take-ups
 - Limits to lumpsum amounts
 - Financial choice architecture





